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The Representation of Indigent
Criminal Defendants in Kentucky
By JMININGs T. Brad
Ed note: This article was written in April, 1964, and revised in September,
1964. In a field as rapidly developing as right to counsel it is inevitable that some
of the material will be dated. It is felt that Mr. Bird's work is of great value,
particularly in his historical analysis and his recommendations.
INTRODUCTION
The importance of skilled legal assistance in defending crimi-
nal actions has long been recognized, as is indicated by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is unfortunate
that the adequacy of the defense available under this Amend-
ment is largely determined by the amount of money available
to the defendant. The problem of providing adequate representa-
tion for those accused of criminal offenses but unable to pay for
an adequate defense has no easy solution. Several systems have
been developed as a means of providing competent legal assist-
ance for these persons and thereby fulfilling the state's duty in
this regard. This study investigates the adequacy of the system
presently used in Kentucky to provide the needed representation
of indigent defendants and to discharge the state's duty. Of
necessity it deals with the constitutional right to counsel as it has
developed and with the unclarified extent to which states must
provide counsel for indigent defendants under the recent decisions
in Gideon v. Wainwright' and related cases.' It seems appro-
priate to examine the status of the right to assigned counsel as
it exists in the United States as a whole before turning to the
specific situation in Kentucky.
No attempt has been made here to solve the problem of
retrospective versus prospective application of the Gideon stand-
1372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963).
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ard, once determined, and the right to counsel on appeal has been
dealt with only secondarily. The emphasis has been placed on
the scope of the state's duty to provide counsel, both as to the
types of crimes to which it applies and the point in time at
which it begins. The statewide assigned counsel system utilized
in Kentucky is discussed, and its effectiveness as a means of
protecting the indigent's rights and fulfilling the state's obligation
is evaluated.
A study of the Kentucky constitutional and statutory pro-
visions dealing with the right to assigned counsel does not give
an understanding of the system as actually implemented. There-
fore, questionnaires were sent to the judges of some of the trial
courts to determine how the system is administered in reality
and whether it varies from the statutory mandate. In addition,
economic and demographic characteristics of Kentucky were
taken into account in evaluating the effectiveness of the system
for the state as a whole.
An evaluation of the existing system is of limited significance
in itself. The conclusions are meaningful only to the extent that
improvements are possible. Accordingly, the Kentucky system
is compared with the organized defender offices as alternative
methods of dealing with the basic problem. Recommendations
are then made for improving the existing system and for in-
corporating alternative systems where necessary to provide for
differences between communities, differences that are now largely
disregarded.
PART I: THE CoNsrruToNAL RIGHT TO ASSIGNED CouNsEL
A. The Need for Assigned Counsel
The need for counsel is evident from the nature of criminal
proceedings and the layman's meagre knowledge of law, espe-
cially of the intricacies of legal procedure. A frequently quoted
statement by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabamda ex-
plicitly presents the plight of the layman when charged with a
criminal offense:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with
3 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with
the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may
be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant
and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect.
The adversary system operates on the assumption that each
litigant will discover and present materials that build the strong-
est case for him and show his adversary's weakness. This process
should result in the truth being found by an impartial tribunal.
The defendant without counsel does not receive the benefits of
this system. It is contradictory to say there is an adversary
proceeding where a specialized, skilled prosecutor proceeds
against a poor defendant who is unable to understand the charge
against him.4 Furthermore, a defendant cannot rely on an appeal
to reverse an unjust conviction due to lack of counsel because
he may have no knowledge of the right to appeal. Even if he
does, he probably will not make the necessary objections during
the trial, he may be unable to make an intelligent decision
whether to appeal, and he is no more capable of taking an appeal
effectively by himself than he is of adequately conducting his
defense. 5
The need for the expert advice and counsel of a lawyer at the
trial is clear. But this need is even greater for the indigent
defendant than for his financially able counterpart since the
indigent frequently is less educated and informed; and, since he
usually cannot furnish bail, he is more often forced to remain in
jail where he cannot prepare an adequate defense. No one
4 Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 61-62 (1951).
5 People v. Breslin, 4 N.Y.2d 73, 149 N.E.2d 85, 90, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 164
(1958) (dissenting opinion); Special Committee to Study Defender Systems,
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, Equal Justicef or the Accused 87 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Equal Justice].
6 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 35.
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should be deprived of the advantage of having counsel for his
defense simply because he is poor. The "danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence"' is not
diminished by indigency, nor does it endow a defendant with the
"sdil and knowledge"s necessary for defense preparation, qualities
his financially able brethren lack. Such an indigent can have an
adequate defense only if counsel is provided for him by some
other means.
In addition to the need for protecting the rights of the
individual, society itself has a need for the provision of counsel
to the indigent. Our society is largely built on our concern for the
protection of fundamental human rights, among them freedom
and equality before the law. To arbitrarily deprive any segment
of our society of freedom is to deny those persons the equal
protection expressed by our substantive law. Concern for this
societal need is expressed in these words by Reginald Heber
Smith:'
To withhold the equal protection of the laws, or to fail to
carry out their intent, by reason of inadequate machinery, is
to undermine the entire structure and threaten it with collapse.
For the State to erect an uneven, partial administration of
justice is to abnegate the very responsibility for which it exists,
and is to accomplish by indirection an abridgment of the
fundamental rights which the State is directly forbidden to
infringe.
Since this result is contrary to the ideals and principles upon
which our society is based, the preservation of our society de-
pends to an extent upon providing all elements of a fair trial for
every accused unable to provide them for himself. The assistance
of counsel is such an element.
The protection of society is another reason for providing
counsel for the indigent. If a defendant is embittered over a legal
process resulting in a conviction due to inadequate representation,
society is not well protected. Until that bitterness is removed,
the correctional function of our penal system cannot be served.
Yet the prisoner is worthwhile to society only if he has a desire to
7 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see text accompanying note 3
supra.
8 Ibid.
0 R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor 5 (1919).
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find his place, make necessary adjustments and live a productive
and useful life. If he leaves the courtroom hating the legal
system that has convicted him without adequate defense, the
chances for rehabilitation are minimal."°
The need for assigned counsel extends beyond those who
would be considered destitute. A common argument is that if a
defendant can make bail, he should not receive the assistance of
assigned counsel." The assumption underying this argument,
that if he can make bail he can afford to retain counsel, is
dispelled by the results of an investigation by the Junior Bar
Section of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia. Of
the eighty-two defendants studied who were free on bond but
who at the same time had court appointed, uncompensated
counsel, "virtually all of the defendants ...would, under any
reasonable standard, be considered sufficiently impoverished to
require free legal service."'2
B. Development of the Constitutional Right to Assigned Counsel
The Right in Federal Courts
Recognition of the need for defense counsel was embodied in
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution which
provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to .. .the assistance of counsel for his defense." This
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst 3
to mean that, in the absence of effective waiver, the defendant in
all criminal cases has the right to have counsel furnished by the
government if he cannot afford to employ his own. The argument
has been made'4 that the Sixth Amendment, when enacted, did
not include the right to have assigned counsel. The argument is
based on the fact that the Sixth Amendment was proposed in
September, 1789,'5 and in April, 1790, seven months before the
Sixth Amendment was ratified, Congress passed an Act' stating:
3
0 Bennett, To Secure the Right to Counsel, 32 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 177, 181
(1949).
"1 See, e.g., 22 Legal Aid Brief Case 170 (1964).
12 Ibid.
13 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
14 Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1, 8 (1944); Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 28 (1955).
15 Ibid.
16 1 Stat. 118 (1790).
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Every person who is indicted of treason or other capital crime,
shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel learned
in the law; and the court before which he is tried, or some
judge thereof, shall immediately, upon his request, assign to
him such counsel not exceeding two, as he may desire, and
they shall have free access to him at all reasonable hours.
From this it is reasoned that Congress passed the Act because,
in its view, the Sixth Amendment was irrelevant to the issue of
appointment of counsel. 17 That is, if the Sixth Amendment in-
cluded the right to have counsel appointed, there was no reason
for Congress to pass this measure.
Such an unqualified conclusion is unwarranted. If one pro-
posal deals with a problem in a general way and a second proposal
by the same body deals with a specific aspect of the general
problem, then it is unsound reasoning to conclude that the first
proposal excludes the content of the second. It must be borne in
mind that the Act set forth both the right to retained counsel
and the right to assigned counsel in these cases. If the "exclu-
sionary" argument is to be made for the latter provision, it should
also be applied to the former dealing with the right to retain
counsel. The argument could thus render the Sixth Amendment
meaningless with respect to treason and capital cases. It is more
likely that this Act was the first step by Congress toward merging
the incongruous English laws that there was a right to counsel
for treason' and for misdemeanors, 19 but not in the large area in
betNveen.20
Furthermore, if the legislative body is to be regarded as one
of two interpreters of the Constitution, as it must be if it is to
discharge its function of enacting legislation that falls within the
limits set by the Constitution, such a statute can be considered a
legislative ratification of the constitutional provision as applied
to certain specific problems. Such ratification should not be
interpreted as a full explanation of the constitutional provision
since there is no requirement that Congress legislate to the
maximum extent permissible.
Regardless, a final determination of whether the right to have
17 Holtzoff, supra note 14 at 8, Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14 at 28.
187 and 8 W.3, c.3, s.1 (1695).
19 Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14 at 8-9.
20 Ibid.
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counsel appointed was originally intended to be included in the
Sixth Amendment is unnecessary for our purpose. The great
generalities of the Constitution, especially equal protection and
due process, prohibit assigning a static interpretation to the scope
of the Sixth Amendment and provide the means by which the
Constitution can meet new demands posed by changing circum-
stances. Due process speaks both for the future and for the
present and thus cannot be confined to a particular set of cir-
cumstances; at any given time it "includes those procedures that
are fair and feasible in the light of then existing values and
capabilities.2
The decision in Johnson v. Zerbst2 is sometimes regarded as
a radical departure from previously accepted interpretations of
the Sixth Amendment.23 Certainly a constitutional doctrine was
reversed, as the federal courts before that case were not required
to appoint counsel; but no precedent was overruled." However,
the historic trend of our country since the middle of the eigh-
teenth century has been to expand the protection of human
rights. And a consideration of cases prior to Johnson v. Zerbst
indicates that the Supreme Court was then concerned with the
protection of the right to a fair trial.2" From this it can be seen
that the case in reality established a rule protecting a right the
Court had previously dealt with on an ad hoc basis.
The Right in State Courts
The standards established by the Supreme Court for the states
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
were considerably different from those required in the federal
courts under the Sixth Amendment. Six years prior to Johnson v.
Zerbst, the Court in Powell v. Alabama26 held that in a capital
case a state court must assign counsel to an accused incapable of
adequately defending himself because of such factors as ignor-
ance, feeble mindedness or illiteracy. The language of the
21 Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
6 (1956).
22 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see text accompanying note 14.23 E.g., Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14, at 44.
24 Before that case, the Supreme Court had not dealt with the duty of the
federal courts to provide counsel in felony cases.
25 See the discussion in Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14 at 30-36 and the cases
cited therein.
26287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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opinion made it clear that merely formal appointment of counsel
must be distinguished from effective representation."
In Betts v. Brady28 the Supreme Court rejected the oppor-
tunity to invoke upon the state courts the duty required of the
federal courts after Johnson v. Zerbst, that the trial court in all
criminal cases must provide counsel for an accused unable to
employ his own unless he effectively waived that right. The
Court concluded in Betts that the "appointment of counsel is not
a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial,"29 and held that the
failure to appoint counsel under the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case was not sufficiently offensive to amount to a
denial of due process. 30 Thus, the "fair trial" or "special circum-
stances" rule was established, requiring the state courts to advise
the defendant of his right to counsel and to appoint counsel only
if the failure to do so resulted in demonstrable and substantial
injustice to the accused in view of all the circumstances of the
case.3' This standard was less rigorous than that established for
the federal courts.
The special circumstances rule was unsatisfactory since it was
incapable of reasonably precise definition and it could only be
applied retrospectively. Thus the courts were precluded from
precisely satisfying the standard before trial since the fair trial
determination must await the completion of the proceedings and
the development of the special circumstances during the proceed-
ings. As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting
opinion in Bute v. Illinois,3 2 the special circumstances test did
not provide guidelines by which the need for counsel necessary
to render the trial fair could be determined. His approach would
have avoided the need for an ad hoc determination of the
27 " .. that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such time or under
such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case." Id. at 71.
28 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
29 Id. at 471.
30 Id. at 472-473.
31 Factors which were subsequently considered significant in determining
that due process had been denied by the failure to appoint counsel were the
gravity of the offense; the complexity of the issues; the defendant's age; his
mental capacity; his previous training, education and experience; his knowledge
of law and procedure; the degree of protection given him by the court; and
whether any advantage was taken of him by officers or prosecutors before or
during trial. Annotation 93 L.Ed. 137, 149; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437, 441 (1948).
32 333 U.S. 640 (1948).
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consequences of all the surrounding circumstances. In his view,
"the need for counsel... is not determined by the complexities
of the case or the ability of the particular person who stands as
an accused before the court. That need is measured by the nature
of the charge and the ability of the average man to face it alone,
unaided by an expert in the law."m
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment protection, the
right to counsel is contained in all state constitutions except
Virginia's. 4 These provisions are essentially the same as the
Sixth Amendment provision, but the interpretations vary con-
siderably, frequently excluding the right to assigned counsel as
a state constitutional guaranty. Except for seven states these
provisions are construed as merely giving the defendant the
right to appear in court and defend himself with retained
counsel.35
C. Gideon v. Wainwright: Where to Draw the Line?
After Betts v. Brady, 6 in the absence of special circumstances
a state was denied the power to force a person into a non-capital
criminal trial without a lawyer if he desired one and could afford
to retain one, but the limitation was removed if the defendant
was too poor to retain counsel. This established a line between
rich and poor that was repugnant both to due process and to
equal protection. In Gideon v. Wainwright3 7 the Supreme Court
overruled Betts v. Brady and held that the appointment of counsel
is a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial, and that failure to
appoint counsel was a denial of due process. The Court pointed
out that when it decided to the contrary in Betts it departed from
its own well-considered precedents." The Court returned to these
earlier precedents, restoring "constitutional principles established
to achieve a fair system of Justice."39
33Id. at 682 (dissenting opinion).34 Betts v. Brady, 816 U.S. 455, 467-468 (1942); Alaska Const. art. I, §
11; Hawaii Const. art. I, § 11. In Virginia, the phrase 'law of the land' in
art. 1, § 8 includes the fundamental right to counsel under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 810 (1953);
Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948).
35 Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14, at 81-84.
36 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
37372 U.S. 835 (1968).
38Id. at 348-844, citing excerpts from Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462
(1939), and Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 283, 243-244 (1936).
9 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
[Vol. 53,
1965] REPESENTATION OF INDIGENT Cmnvu.NA DFACNrs 487
The essential problem now faced by the states is to determine
the extent of this duty to provide counsel for indigent accuseds.
It is quite likely that the court will not be unanimous in the extent
of the applicability of the Gideon rule. Mr. Justice Harlan can
be expected to attempt to confine its scope to prosecutions
involving a "substantial prison sentence."40 This would, in effect,
limit it to felonies, since felonies are typically punishable by
confinement in prison whereas the place of imprisonment for
misdemeanors is typically a county jail or workhouse.4 If he used
the term "prison" to mean any place of imprisonment, then the
limitation would depend upon his definition of a substantial
sentence. On the other hand, Justices Black and Douglas will
undoubtedly insist that the rule requires the states to provide
counsel in "all criminal prosecutions."4' It is highly probable that
Mr. Justice Black intended to incorporate the full scope of the
Sixth Amendment right to assigned counsel into the due process
clause when he wrote the opinion, as he was one of the four
"incorporators" in fourteen non-capital cases which reached the
Supreme Court on the issue of right to appointed counsel sub-
sequent to Betts v. Brady.
It seems clear that a majority of the Court did intend to
incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause
the Sixth Amendment right to assigned counsel in all criminal
prosecutions. The problem then becomes one of defining a
crininal prosecution. If the term were limited to felonies, a state
could attempt to avoid the mandate of Gideon by reclassifying
an offense from felony to misdemeanor. But the state character-
ization would not bind the Supreme Court when the content of
40 Id. at 351 (concurring opinion).
41 E.g. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 431.060 (1963) [hereinafter cited as KRS]. "Offenses
are either felonies or misdemeanors. Offenses punishable with death or confinement
in the penitentiary are felonies..."
42 "All crminal prosecutions" is the term used in the Sixtha Amendment. In
Gideon Mr. Justice Black wrote: "We think the Court in Betts was wrong, how-
ever, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of
these fundamental rights." 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963). Mr. Justice Douglas stated
that "rights protected against state invasion by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment are not watered-down versions of what the Bill of Bights
guarantees." 372U.S.347.
43See Beaney, op. cit. supra note 14, at 164-194, 280-232 and cases cited
therein. The incorporators urged the outright incorporation of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel (including the right to original counsel) into the Fourteenth
Amendment, opposing the appraisal of all the circumstances of each case urged
by the fair trial adherents.
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a federal right is at issue,44 and the right to assigned counsel is a
federal right. Thus, even if the Gideon mandate were limted to
felony cases, federal characterization of felonies would prevail.
This characterization could be cast in the following terms: The
due process right to assigned counsel extends to all indigents
charged with any offense designated a felony by the state and,
regardless of state classification, to any other state offense
punishable by confinement for more than one year (the definition
of felony now generally employed) .4 The states' entire class of
felonies would be accepted without question because of the moral
condemnation attaching to the label, the loss of civil rights, and
the deprivation of many occupations.40
Although such a federal characterization approach is feasible,
the distinction it draws between felonies and misdemeanors is
unsatisfactory. This distinction is offensive if any statutory mis-
demeanors involve conduct more dangerous to others than some
felonies. For example, compare a common misdemeanor such as
reckless or drunken driving7r with the felony of distilling alcohol
in violation of revenue laws.48 In addition, such a distinction is
unfair to the defendant, who is just as effectively deprived of his
liberty by imprisonment for one year for a misdemeanor as for
a felony. Though the loss of civil rights accompanying misde-
meanor and felony convictions is not the same, the practical
impact on the family from loss of a job and subsequent unem-
ployment upon release may be the same.
Discarding the mechanical felony-misdemeanor distinction,
the essential question is whether Gideon really extends to offenses
which are in substance and reality misdemeanors. To extend the
right to assigned counsel, at public expense, to such minor offenses
as traflic violations, vagrancy and drunkenness which are in sub-
stance and reality misdemeanors would be impractical. Further-
more, fairness to the defendant does not require assigned counsel
in these minor offenses; indeed, the injection of a lawyer into
many of these cases is irrelevant. But "serious misdemeanors"
44 lKamisar, Betts v. Brady, Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and
Due Process Values, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 219, 265-266 (1962).
45 Id. at 266.
46 Ibid.
4 7 E.g. KRS 189.520 (1963).4 8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 5606.
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such as petty larceny, simple assault or drunken driving are
different. Regardless of the penalty imposed, a conviction of an
offense of this type involves some degree of moral condemnation
which, though less than that attaching to a felony, does not attach
to a conviction for a parking violation or for disturbing the peace.
Approaching the problem in this manner invokes an element
of judgment rather than a mechanical standard. The problem is
in determining what standard of judgment is to be used to split
"criminal offenses" into two groups, to one of which the right to
assigned counsel does not apply while to the other it does apply.
All of the Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to trial
by jury, are qualified by the term "criminal prosecutions."49 Since
the Supreme Court has dealt with the term in trial-by-jury cases,
it is appropriate to look for a definition there.
In Schick v. United Statee° the Supreme Court upheld the
distinction between petty offenses and other criminal offenses by
referring to traditional colonial procedures involving minor of-
fenses and held that "crimes" in Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution does not include "petty offenses." In short, there is
no federal right to a jury trial for those charged with petty of-
fenses. Although the term "petty offense" has been incorporated
into a mechanical standard in the United States Code"' and a
dividing line of a maximum penalty may raise a presumption of
petty character, the petty offense concept
invokes judgment and not mechanical tests in the use of
common-law history in the life of the law today. We cannot
exclude recognition of a scale of moral values according to
which some offenses are heinous and some are not.... The
history of the common law does not solve the problems of
judgment which it raises in demonstrating that the guaranty
of a jury did not cover offenses which, because of their quality
and their consequences, had a relatively minor place in the
register of misconducts.
52
49 "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury .. .and to have the assistance of counsel for
his defense."
G0 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1. A petty offense is there defined as "any misdemeanor, the
penalt, for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a
ne of $500 or both."
62 Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 981 (1926).
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Thus the moral judgment reflected in the historical classifica-
tion of petty offenses must be considered in making a decision
as to what crimes the right to assigned counsel extends. But of
equal significance in this determination is the moral judgment
involved in offenses which are new or are considered to be more
or less serious than previously. The resultant variation in classi-
fication that could attach to a specific act with the passage of
time is justifiable on the basis that due process has no static
content but includes those procedures that are fair and practical
in the light of values and capabilities existing at a given time. 3
Aside from the punishment invoked, a strong indication of the
moral condemnation involved is embodied in the after effects
of a conviction, 54 whether they are loss of civil rights, deprivation
of the right to engage in certain occupations or merely loss of a
particular job not within those occupations. Unofficial sanctions
of this sort may be more indicative of the moral condemnation
involved than the penalties imposed by law.
There is already an indication of the federal courts' willingness
to extend the right to assigned counsel beyond felony cases, and
to base the determination on the nature and seriousness of the
offense charged. In Evans v. Rives 5 the Court of Appeals held
that the defendant was entitled to appointed counsel if he could
not afford his own when charged with non-support of a minor
child, an offense punishable by one year in the workhouse. The
District Court contended that the right to counsel did not apply
to any misdemeanor, but the court ruled to the contrary. The
court points out there was no felony-misdemeanor distinction in
the wording of the guaranty, there was no authority for the
distinction and "as far as the right to the assistance of counsel
is concerned, the Constitution draws no distinction between loss
of liberty for a short period and loss for a long time."56
The serious misdemeanor-petty offense distinction of the
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is urged as the appropriate
standard for determining the extent of the applicability of Gideon.
53 Schaefer, supra note 21.
54 See Green, Post Conviction Disabilities Imposed or Authorized by Law,
15-30 and Appendices A-F, 62-74 (1960) (unpublished student paper in
Harvard Law School Library).
55 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
56Id. at 638.
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It is fair to the defendant, it is not beyond the administrative
capabilities of a well-organized system," and past decisions in a
related area indicate that the Supreme Court may foreseeably
establish this standard.
D. When the Right to Assigned Counsel Begins
The need for assistance of counsel is by no means limited to
the confines of the courtroom or to the time actually spent in
courtroom proceedings. Rather the need exists wherever "that
which is simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the
untrained layman may appear intricate, complex and mysteri-
ous."" Thus it exists whenever a person's procedural or sub-
stantive rights are endangered because of his ignorance or inex-
perience. Such is the defendant's situation immediately after
arrest.
Though the need for counsel prior to arraignment is evident,
the right to assigned counsel in federal courts begins at arraign-
ment." Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires the commissioner at the preliminary examination to
inform the defendant of his right to retain counsel and allow him
time and opportunity to consult counsel, but it does not mention
assigned counsel. Rule 44 requires the assignment of counsel
once the accused appears in court "unless he elects to proceed
without counsel or is able to obtain counsel."60 In drafting the
Rules, the Advisory Committee considered the possibility of
requiring the assignment of counsel at the preliminary examina-
tion. The idea was rejected, the committee stating that the Rule
was intended to demonstrate that the right to assigned counsel
applies only to proceedings in court and does not include the
preliminary hearing. 1
In general, the right to assigned counsel in the state courts
follows the lead of Rule 44 of the Federal Rules and becomes
effective at arraignment. 2 In Hamilton v. Alabama,63 the Supreme
57 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 51, 69-70, 72-73; Brownell, Legal Aid in
the United States, 206-207 (1951).
5 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
59 Council v. Clemmer, 177 F.2d 22, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 830 (1949); Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
Co Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
01 Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, 18 U.S.C.A. Fed. R. Crim. P. 44.
02 Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 87-89, 94-101 (1955).
03 363 U.S. 52 (1961).
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Court held that the lack of counsel on arraignment in the state
court was reversible error regardless of whether demonstrable
prejudice resulted. The court reasoned that "only the presence
of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the
defenses available to him and to plead intelligently."64 In other
words, the advice of counsel was essential to fairness at the
arraignment.
Subsequent to Gideon v. Wainwright,(5 the Court held in
White v. Maryland66 that the lack of assigned counsel at a pre-
liminary hearing was reversible error. However, the preliminary
hearing in that case was essentially equivalent to arraignment
since the accused entered a plea before a magistrate, and the
plea was later admissible against him. The Court affirmed its
earlier statement in Hamilton that there was no need to determine
whether prejudice resulted.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held since
Gideon that there is no constitutional right to be furnished
counsel at a preliminary hearing in a state court in a capital
case.67 But the court went on to say that the refusal to appoint
counsel did not prejudice the defendant, implying that lack of
assigned counsel at the hearing would be reversible error if
prejudice occurred. This appears to be an application of the
special circumstances rule of Betts v. Brady68 to the preliminary
hearing. That rule is not amenable to precise application by a
trial court and is equally unsatisfactory as a standard for an
examining court.
The effect of Gideon on the question of when the right to
assigned counsel accrues is to narrow the issue to a determination
of whether the right to assigned counsel prior to arraignment
is an essential element of a fair trial. It is submitted that the
present system of denying assigned counsel until arraignment is
inherently unfair to the accused.
If at any time, from the time of his arrest to final determination
of his guilt or innocence, an accused really needs the help of
an attorney, it is in the pretrial period... Indeed, the pretrial
641d. at 55.
65 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
66373 U.S. 59 (1963).
6 7 Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963).
68316 U.S. 450 (1942).
[Vol. 53,
1965] REPRESENTATION OF INDiGET CRnrmNL DEFENDANTs 493
period is so full of hazards for the accused that, if unaided by
competent legal advice, he may lose any legitimate defense he
may have long before he is arraigned and put on trial.,,
If the arraignment is a "critical stage . . . where rights are
preserved or lost,""u fairness demands that the defendant be
given an opportunity to adequately prepare his defense of those
rights prior to the arraignment. As previously noted 7 1 prepara-
tion of an adequate defense requires legal assistance. Certainly
a prosecutor in a serious criminal case would not consider waiting
until arraignment to make an extensive investigation of the facts,
to conduct a thorough interrogation of the accused or to locate
and question witnesses. 2 However, unless defense counsel is
assigned in advance of arraignment there is no opportunity for
equal preparation and the criminal proceeding cannot be said to
be fair. The delay alone is unfair. Failure to appoint counsel
prior to arraignment cannot be justified by showing that in a
particular case no defense witness disappeared or no relevant
facts became indeterminable. Such a standard is purely retro-
spective in application, thus making an adequate determination
impossible when the question initially presents itself.
Failure to appoint counsel prior to arraignment also makes a
distinction based solely on the amount of money available to
the accused. If he has enough money he can retain counsel and
prepare his defense in advance of arraignment; if he hasn't the
money, he must await arraignment to even begin preparing his
defense. Once the right of an indigent to have counsel appointed
for his defense is recognized, the opportunity to prepare that
defense should be equal to the opportunity possessed by the
prosecution or by an accused with sufficient means to retain
counsel. This equality can obtain by appointing counsel at the
preliminary hearing. Failure to so appoint is a denial of equal
protection as well as being unfair as between accuser and accused.
It is arguable that the right to assigned counsel should extend
to the moment of arrest. If the assistance of counsel is needed
09 Note, Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel Prior to Trial, 44 Ky. L. J.
103-104 (1955).
70 White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
71 See text accompanying note 3 supra.
7 2 Beaney, The Right to Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 771,
780 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Beaney, Counsel Before Arraignment].
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to make our adversary system a reality, then the right to
assigned counsel should accrue at the earliest moment the state
assumes an adversary position as prosecutor. This role attaches
when the accused is arrested and deprived of his liberty. How-
ever, it would be difficult to provide for assignment of counsel
immediately upon arrest; and it would be unreasonable to expect
the police, who are responsible for apprehending those suspected
of crime, to willingly assign competent counsel to the accused.
73
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that even the right to
consult counsel does not necessarily accrue at arrest, 4 even if the
attorney has been retained prior to arrest.75 Until these cases
are overruled, the right to assigned counsel cannot be expected
to accrue at the time of arrest.
On the other hand, it is not unreasonable to require the
assignment of counsel at the preliminary hearing, and there are
distinct advantages to the court in doing so. It would not unduly
burden the magistrate to be required to advise the defendant
of his right to retain counsel and to provide counsel through the
normal channels if the accused is indigent. This would not be an
added burden on the courts as a whole, but merely a shifting
of the duty from the trial court to the examining court. Such
a procedure would be an aid to the courts by decreasing the
number of attacks on the acceptance of guilty pleas at arraign-
ment on the basis of insufficient advice.76 In addition, if the
accused pleaded not guilty, the trial could proceed without
delay and without danger of attack on the grounds of insufficient
time to prepare a defense.77 Provision of adequate time between
the preliminary hearing and arraignment would eliminate the
need for continuances after arraignment and would thus help
prevent inefficient use of the trial court's time.
Providing counsel at the preliminary hearing is a basic step
in providing equal opportunities for both sides to prepare for
trial. The prosecution's case appears at the preliminary hearing,
allowing the defense counsel, if appointed at that time, to
73 Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 211 (1955) [hereinafter
cited as Beaney, Right to Counsel].
74 Crooker v. California, 857 U.S. 438 (1958).
75 Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958).76 Beaney, Right to Counsel, supra note 73, at 212.
77 Ibid.
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investigate the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's
case before trialJ8 This equates the defendant in this respect
with the prosecutor, who now has the opportunity to investigate
the defendant's case before trial. Representation at the pre-
liminary hearing is not a luxury for the rich but a necessary part
of the administration of justice.
Requiring the assignment of counsel at the preliminary hear-
ing would not prevent the police and prosecutors from inter-
rogating accused persons after arrest to decide whether to charge
them, nor exclude confessions then obtained.79 In order to pre-
vent lengthy detention incommunicado, the assignment of counsel
at the preliminary hearing must be accompanied by a require-
ment that the preliminary hearing be held without unnecessary
delay.
Admittedly the typical assigned counsel system may be in-
adequate to protect the rights of indigents at a preliminary hear-
ing; but the experience of adequately staffed defender offices8°
indicates that appropriate means are available by which a state
can fulfill its responsibility once the duty is recognized.
E. The Right to Assigned Counsel on Appeal
In general, it is felt that an appeal is not necessary for due
process and that counsel appointed for trial is not required to
proceed after sentence.8 ' The right to assigned counsel at trial
is considered a requirement of due process since the trial is a
requisite to execution of a sentence; but an appeal is not a
condition precedent to punishment, and hence the failure to
assign counsel on appeal is not a denial of due process.8" In the
federal courts, the trial court may refuse to appoint counsel if it
thinks the appeal lacks merit;8 3 but a certification by the district
court that the appeal is not meritorious is not binding on the
circuit court, and the circuit court has a duty to appoint counsel
on appeal from such a decision. 4
7SWillcox and Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a Rural Area of the
Representation of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 559 (1959).
70 Beaney, Counsel Before Arraignment, supra note 72, at 782.
80 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 71, 74.
81 De Maurez v. S ttope, 104 F.2d 758 (9th r. 1939).
S
2 McKajne v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
.53 Gargano v. United States, 140 F.2d 118 (1944).
84 Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957).
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If the appeal is granted, failure by the trial court to appoint
counsel may be error on the theory that the new state in the
proceedings requires the presence of counsel,85 and the appellate
court may appoint counsel on appeal in order to make the
appellate procedure effective if the trial court fails to do so."6
A similar situation is found in the state courts, where appellate
review is not a constitutional right.8' But the Supreme Court held
in Griffin v. Illinois8 8 that both due process and equal protection
are denied where a state statute providing for appeal as a matter
of right is administered so as to deny full appellate review solely
on account of an appellant's poverty. The Court in Griffin pointed
out that the state is not required by the federal Constitution to
provide appellate review, but once it has extended the right it
cannot discriminate in its availability on the grounds of poverty.
The trial court in that case was required to furnish a free copy
of the transcript of the trial testimony to an indigent appellant
since presentation of such a transcript was a prerequisite to ob-
taining appellate review.
The right to assigned counsel would apparently fall within
the rationale of Griffin since it pertains to the adequacy and
effectiveness of appellate review. A dissent by Judge Fuld in
People v. Breslin89 depicts the plight of the unassisted appellant
in these words:
No matter how intelligent or educated, a layman does not have
the know-how to analyze the evidence and evaluate it, much
less the special ability necessary to search out errors or argue
points of law, even if he happens to recognize them. Thus,
effective submission of an appeal requires more than pos-
session by the defendant of a transcript of the minutes of the
trial. Any kind of effective presentation demands the aid of a
lawyer....
In substance there appears to be no difference between giving
85 Reid v. Sanford, 42 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
86 Holmes v. United States, 126 F.2d 431 (8th cir. 1942); for a more complete
discussion of the right to counsel on appeal, see Beaney, Right to Counsel, supra
note 73, at 72-73.
87 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); Miller v. Commonwealth, 127
Ky. 387, 105 S.W. 899, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 410 (1907).
88351 U.S. 12 (1956).
894 N.Y.2d 73, 81, 149 N.E.2d 85, 90, 172 N.Y.S.2d 157, 164 (1958) (dis-
senting opinion).
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the defendant a free transcript and providing him with an attor-
ney for the appeal.
The Supreme Court has since dealt with the issue in Douglas
v. California0 and has held it is a denial of equal protection for a
state court to refuse to appoint counsel to represent an indigent
on the only appeal granted as a matter of right. The Court
struck down a California procedure by which the state appellate
court, when requested by an indigent to provide counsel for
appeal, investigated the record and appointed counsel only if it
would be helpful to either the court or the appellant. The Court
said this discriminated between the rich man who can require
the court to listen to the skilled argument of counsel before
deciding on the merits and the poor man who cannot. It is this
discrimination that violates the rule of Griffin v. Illinois.
F. Summary
It cannot be denied that there is an urgent need for the
assistance of skilled counsel in defending a criminal prosecution.
The need for assigned counsel for those unable to retain their
own is even more urgent since these people are frequently less
educated and informed than their financially able counterparts
and usually must remain in jail with no opportunity to adequately
prepare a defense even if they have the ability. Society itself has
a need for the provision of counsel for these people in order to
avoid undermining the very principles upon which our society
is based. Furthermore, the interest of society in its own protection
from recidivists demands the assignment of counsel to indigents
so that those convicted will be more receptive to the correctional
process of our penal system.
The right to counsel in criminal proceedings in this country
is embodied in the Sidxth Amendment of the federal Constitution
and in all but one of the state constitutions, but the interpretation
of this right has not been uniform. Before Johnson v. Zerbst the
the federal courts did not recognize a duty to appoint counsel.
That case imposed upon those courts the duty to appoint counsel
in all criminal proceedings unless the accused has, or effectively
waives, the assistance of counsel. It is debatable whether the
00372 U.S. 353 (1963).
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL
framers of the Sixth Amendment intended for the right to counsel
to include the right to assigned counsel, but the great generalities
of the Constitution render this issue irrelevant.
The standard for state trial courts differed considerably from
the standard for the federal courts. In Powell v. Alabama the
Supreme Court established the rule that state courts must assign
counsel in a capital case if the defendant was unable to defend
himself because of such factors as feeblemindedness or ignorance.
But the Court rejected the opportunity to apply the rule to all
felony cases in Betts v. Brady, where the special circumstances
rule was established. This standard was incapable of reasonably
precise definition and, being purely retrospective in application,
it could not be effectively applied by a trial court. In Gideon v.
Wainunight the Court explicitly overruled Betts and held that the
assignment of counsel was an essential element of a fair trial, the
denial of which was a denial of due process. But the Court failed
to define in precise terms the limits of the right to assigned
counsel. Clearly it would include all felonies; but it is uncertain
how far beyond this the Court intended to go, though the lan-
gnage of the opinion sweeps beyond such artificial limitations
as the felony-misdemeanor distinction. It is concluded that the
petty offense concept, invoking an element of judgment rather
than mechanical rules, is the proper place to draw the line.
Furthermore, there are reasons of fairness to the defendant,
administrative practicality and historical distinctions in the re-
lated area of the right to trial by jury for expecting the Supreme
Court to eventually draw such a line.
Traditionally the right to assigned counsel begins at araign-
ment and ends with judgment. There is a distinct need for the
assistance of counsel before this point and the delay is inherently
unfair as between the accuser and the accused and denies the
defendant the equal protection under law. Requiring the assign-
ment of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential in provid-
ing equal opportunities for both sides to prepare for trial.
Although appellate review by itself is not a constitutional right,
when an appeal is allowed as a matter of right it is a denial of
equal protection to fail to appoint counsel to take the appeal
for an indigent appellant.
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PART II: TBE RiGHT TO ASSIGNED CouNsEL IN KENTUCKY
A. The Scope of the Problem
The right to assigned counsel in Kentucky cannot be con-
sidered in any meaningful manner without a general idea of the
size of the problem. First of all let us compare the overall crime
rate in Kentucky with the national average. Though precise
figures on the total number of all crimes committed in Kentucky
are available, the Uniform Crime Reports,9' prepared by the
Department of justice, provides a means of comparing Kentucky's
situation with the nation as a whole. The data dealt with here
are the Crime Indices.92
While Kentucky's population in 1962 was roughly the same
as in 1958,"3 the crime rate per 100,000 population (Crime Index)
increased 26 per cent.04 The economic conditions caused by wide-
spread unemployment in eastern Kentucky are undoubtedly a
major factor in this increase; it could well have been greater had
not large numbers of people left this region looking for employ-
ment elsewhere. During the same period, the Crime Index for
the United States as a whole increased 28 per cent.95
The difference in increase in the Crime Index for the two
areas appears to be slight, but it is misleading because of the
difference in population distribution. It will be observed that
approximately two-thirds of the national population is located in
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,96 while in Kentucky
91 Dept. of Justice, FBI, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States (1958-
1962) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Crime Reports].
92 The Crime Index is a computation used to indicate the probable extent,
fluctuation and distribution of crime for the U.S. as a whole, various geo-
graphical and population areas and states. The Crime Index consists of seven
important offenses counted as they become known to law enforcemen" agencies.
Crime classifications used are: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary (brealdng or entering), larceny of $50
and over, and auto theft. The Index is expressed as the number of crimes per
100,000 population. The total number of crimes occurring is unknown. Not all
crimes become known to the police, not all are of sufficient importance to be
significant in an index and not all important crimes occur with enough regularity
to be meaningful in an index. With these considerations in min, the above
crimes were selected as a group to furnish an abbreviated and convenient measure
of the crime problem. Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 91 at 84 (1962).
1,3 These population figures are based on the estimate released by the Bureau
of the Census each year and appear in Appendix B.
94 The data on which this calculation is based appears in Appendix B.
95 Ibid.
0 See Appendix B. A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area is generally an
entire county or counties having at least one core city of 50,000 or more, with
the whole meeting the requirement of certain metropolitan characteristics. Uniform
Crime Reports, supra note 91, at 84 (1962).
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those areas comprise only about one-third of the total.97 Further-
more, the crime rates are higher in these metropolitan areas than
elsewhere.9 When the national figures for the basic population
distribution areas are weighted to approximate the Kentucky
distribution, the national Crime Index is approximately 835 com-
pared to Kentucky's 874.99 On the same weighted basis, the
national Index increased only 18 per cent between 1958 and 1962
compared with Kentucky's increase of 26 per cent.'00 In other
words, during this period Kentucky's Crime Index rose almost
50 per cent more than the national average relative to its popula-
tion distribution. True, the data on which these conclusions are
based are themselves only approximations, but at the very least
the data indicate that Kentucky cannot justify refusing to deal
with the problem on the ground that it doesn't affect the state
or that the present system will continue to handle the problem
as adequately as it has in the past.
In various studies, it has been estimated that from 30 per
cent to 60 per cent of those accused of crime cannot afford coun-
sel.'0  Estimates in replies to questionnaires 0 2 sent to judges in
various parts of Kentucky, of both county and circuit courts,
ranged from 40 per cent to 75 per cent. In half of the accused
in Kentucky cannot afford counsel, the importance of the problem
needs no underscoring. This estimate of the percentage of
defendants who cannot afford counsel combined with the recent
large increase in the state Crime Index and the relatively modest
increase in the number of lawyers in the state 0 3 indicate that the
assigned counsel system in Kentucky places an increasingly large
burden on those members of the Bar who are appointed to
defend the indigent. This conclusion is reinforced by personal
conversation with Kentucky lawyers,0 4 revealing that a few years
9 7 Bureau of the Census, I U.S. Census of Population: 1960, as reported in
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1963).
98 See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 91, at 35 (1962).
99 Weighted computation based on data in Appendix B.
100 Ibid.
'0 1 Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 83 (1951); Equal Justice, supra
note 5 at 80.
102 The questionnaire is set forth in Appendix A.
103 Comparison of the Roll of Members, Ky. St. B. J. 30 (1958) with Role of
Members, Ky. B. Ass'n, Directory of the Judicial System of Kentucky 37 (1963)
shows an increase during this period of less than 8%.
104 Conversation with Attorneys in Owensboro and Lexington, Ky., Jan. and
Feb., 1964.
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ago two to four assigned cases per lawyer per year was a normal
load, while today the corresponding members of the Bar may
receive from twelve to twenty cases per year. 0 5
B. Kentucky Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation
The Kentucky Constitution provides in Section 11 that "In all
criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. . . ." Traditionally this was interpreted
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals to allow an accused charged
with a felony to retain counsel if he desired and could afford it, 106
but it was not interpreted as giving the accused a constitutional
right to have counsel appointed. Although there was no statute
providing for appointed counsel in any case, the Court in 1886
spoke of a duty of the courts to make appointments when
appropriate, but refrained from referring to any right of the
defendant to have counsel appointed. 0 7 Later in Williams v.
Commonwealth"' the court implied that the duty arose from
the Kentucky Constitution, but restricted it to cases where the
accused was uneducated and did not fully understand his situa-
tion.
A series of cases"' then held that the court was under no duty
to appoint counsel unless the defendant requested it and made
the necessary showing of financial inability to retain counsel.
But in Gholson v. Commonwealth"" a failure of the trial court
to advise the defendant of his right to counsel and to appoint
counsel if necessary was held to be a denial of a fair and
impartial trial as guaranteed by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant was convicted and
sentenced to two years imprisonment for concealing a deadly
weapon, even though the evidence was discovered by an illegal
search. The court affirmed the view that "to the extent that there
is a constitutional right to counsel in this type of case it stems
105 Ibid.; Replies to Questionnaire, Appendix A.
'o0 Luntz v. Commonvealth, 287 Ky. 517, 154 S.W.2d 548 (1941).
107 Turner v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 78, 1 S.W. 475 (1886).
103 33 Ky. L. Rep. 330, 110 S.W. 339 (1908).
109 Moore v. Commonwealth, 298 Ky. 14, 181 S.W.2d 413 (1944); Hamline
v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 22 152 S.W.2d 297 (1941); Holland v. Common-
wealth, 241 Ky. 813, 45 S.W.2d 476 (1932); Grogan v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky.
484, 1 S..2d 779 (1927).
110 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948).
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directly from the Fourteenth Amendment.. ."111 and pointed out
Kentucky's lack of a statute dealing with appointment of counsel
in felony cases. The court set up the standard that the trial court,
in order to provide a fair trial, must advise the defendant in a
felony case of his rights and determine whether a waiver of
the right to be represented by counsel was made "intelligently,
competently, understandingly and voluntarily,"-"' and expressly
overruled the contrary views in Hamline v. Commonwealth"3 and
Moore v. Commonwealth.14 After Gholson it is clear that Ken-
tucky recognizes a constitutional right of the accused in a felony
case to have counsel appointed, but this right is based on the
Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution and not on
Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
Prior to the Gholson decision, the Court of Appeals in Smith
v. Buchanan"" had rejected the view that failure to assign counsel
is a failure to complete the court and divests the court of juris-
diction to try the case.I" However, in the case of Hart v. Com-
monwealth"' the Court of Appeals held that failure to comply
with the duties established in Gholson was a proper basis for
awarding a new trial without a separate showing of prejudice.
Though not dealing with the problem in terms of divesting the
court of jurisdiction, the result is a refutation of the prior holding
in Smith v. Buchanan.
Aside from the interpretation of constitutional provisions,
both state and federal, there have been various statutes in Ken-
tucky that have referred to the right to assigned counsel without
guaranteeing it. The in forma pauperis provision states that "a
court may allow a poor person residing in this state to prosecute
or defend any action therein without paying costs, whereupon
he shall have any counsel that the court assigns him. . ... -8
II Wade v. Mayo, 834 U.S. 672 (1948). The Gholson case has been said
to provide the indigent accused with the right to assigned counsel under §
11 of the Kentucky Constitution, Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317, 325 (1949); however,
the case is clearly decided under the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
112 Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537, 540 (1948).
113 287 Ky. 22, 152 S.W.2d 297 (1941).
14 298 Ky. 14, 181 S.W.2d 413 (1944).
115 291 Ky. 44, 163 S.W.2d 5 (1942).
11o Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
17 296 S.W.2d 212 (Ky. 1956).
118 KRS 453.190 (1963).
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(Emphasis added). Though not restricting it to any particular
types of cases, this section leaves the appointment of counsel
entirely to the court's discretion and awards the defendant no
absolute right to assigned counsel in any case. No case has been
found whereby a defendant succeeded in obtaining assigned coun-
sel for a criminal trial under this statute. The main use of this
provision in criminal cases has been to obtain a transcript of the
trial at state expense in order to appeal a conviction."1 9
Though Braden v. Commonwealth °20 is limited on its facts to
requiring the trial court to provide a copy of the transcript for
the appeal without prepayment of costs, the reasoning of the
court bears on the right to assigned counsel. The trial court in
this case refused to grant appellant's petition to be furnished a
free transcript under the in forma pauperis provision because the
petitioner had paid four attorneys Two Thousand Two Hundred
Dollars for their assistance at the trial. The court felt that one
who could afford to pay such amounts should not be allowed to
take a pauper appeal. But the Court of Appeals looked beyond
the bare facts of the case and held that under the "peculiar
facts and unusual circumstances"-12 of the case, it was an abuse
of the trial court's discretion to refuse to order the clerk and
reporter to furnish the transcripts. This willingness of the court
to look beyond the presumption raised by the payment of a
substantial fee should also be invoked by the trial courts in
determining whether a defendant should have assigned counsel.
For example, if the charge were sedition, as in Braden, and the
defendant made a clear showing of being able to pay only five
hundred dollars, whereas preparation of an adequate defense
would require several thousand dollars, he should not be denied
the extra assistance he would have received had he been unable
to pay at all.' Defendants of this sort, able to retain counsel
in form but unable to bear the cost of even a reasonably adequate
defense, are in danger of having their right to effective counsel
nullified. Though a willingness to protect these defendants' rights
119 Moy v. Bradley, 806 S.W.2d 296 (Ky. 1957); Braden v. Commonwealth,
277 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1955).
120 277 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1955).
121 Id. at 11.
122 Replies to the Questionnaire for this study (see Appendix A) indicate
that a defendant in a case such as this would receive experienced counsel, and
may have been assigned two attorneys.
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has thus far been shown only on appeal, the rationale of Braden
is equally applicable at the trial level.
Another statute provided that if a misdemeanor defendant
were incarcerated in default of bail and the court before which
he was ordered to appear were not in session, his case would be
transferred to the county court, which would proceed with the
trial, and "if the prisoner has no attorney and is too poor to
employ one, the court shall, at his request, appoint an attorney
to defend him." 23 Although this section has been said to invoke
a duty on the courts to assign counsel on request in all mis-
demeanor cases, 124 no cases have been found to that effect; and
such an interpretation is much broader than the prima facie
meaning of the words. Taken in context,125 the provision seems
to have been almost inadvertently added to a general provision
designed to protect incarcerated defendants from being unneces-
sarily detained in jail while waiting for the state circuit courts
to reconvene for the following term. When the statute was
repealed in 1962,126 it was compiled with other sections into a
new section 1 7 providing for the same transfer of misdemeanor
cases from a court not in session to the county court but omitting
any reference to assignment of counsel. Not only would the
provision in the old statute be inconsistent with the rationale of
Gholson by putting the burden of the initiative on the defendant,
but this specific failure to re-enact the assignment of counsel
provision in 1962 would seem to be an indication by the legisla-
ture that the section was never intended to extend the absolute
right to assigned counsel to misdemanor cases. During the
period this statute was in effect, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that there were no Kentucky statutes conferring an absolute
323 KRS 455.010 (Repealed, Ky. Acts 1962, c. 234, § 57).
124 Beaney, fight to Counsel, supra note 78, at 288, Appendix II; Brownell,
Legal Aid in the United States 302, Appendix C (1951).
125 When a person charged with a misdemeanor is imprisoned in default of
bail and the court in which he was indicted or before which he was ordered to
appear is not in session, the jailer shall at once notify the county judge and the
county attorney . . . The judge shall . . . notify the county attorney who shall
prosecute. The judge shall give the accused notice of the charge against him,
and proceed at once to try the case, or fix a day for its trial, and issue summons
for any witnesses needed by either party. If the prisoner has no attorney and is
too poor to employ one, the court shall, at his request, appoint an attorney to
defend him. KRS 455.010 (Repealed, Ky. Acts 1962, c. 234, § 57).
126 Ky. Acts 1962, c. 234, § 57.
127 KRS 23.145 (1963).
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right to assigned counsel even in felony cases. 28 It would be
logically inconsistent for the state to be required to assign counsel
in all misdemeanor trials but not in felony cases.
The Kentucky legislature in 1962 extensively revised the
existing statutes and enacted the Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure, abolishing the Code of Practice in Criminal Cases.'
129
The Rules, effective January 1, 1963, simplified the previous
procedure and added certain safeguards of individual rights
pertinent to the right of counsel. It is unfortunate that such a
recent major change fails to adequately protect the rights of
indigent defendants.
The right to contact an attorney is now guaranteed by the
following rule: 130
(1) A person arrested and in jail shall have the right to
make immediate communications for the purpose of securing
the services of an attorney.
(2) Any attorney-at-law entitled to practice in the courts
of this Commonwealth shall, at the request of the person
arrested, or of some one acting in his behalf, be permitted to
visit the person arrested.
This section recognizes that the accused needs counsel and
assistance from the beginning. In guaranteeing the right to legal
advice from the time of arrest, Kentucky has emphasized the
unfairness of the rule in Crooker v. California'=' and Cicenia v.
Lagay.
132
Once the person is arrested, he must be taken without
unnecessary delay before a magistrate who proceeds with the
trial or with a preliminary hearing or who transfers the case to a
court of competent jurisdiction.lm The magistrate is required
to "inform the defendant of the charge against him and of his
right to have preliminary hearing or a trial,"'3 4 and to allow the
defendant "reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel.
128 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963); Cholson v.
Commonvealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948).
129 Ky. Acts 1962, c. 234.
130 Ky. R. Crim. P. 2.14.
131 357 U.S. 433 (1958); see text accompanying note 74.
132 357 U.S. 504 (1958); see text accompanying note 75.
13 3 Ky. R. Crim. P. 3.02; Ky. R. Crim. P. 3.04.
13 4 Ky. R. Crim. P. 3.08.
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" . .- "' This rule is based on Federal Rule 5(b),'11 but it inade-
quately protects the accused because it fails to require the
magistrate to inform the accused of his right to counsel. It
violates the spirit of the provision allowing the accused to con-
tact an attorney immediately after arrest by failing to assure
that the accused will know of that right immediately after
arrest. It would not be unreasonable to require the magistrate
to inform the defendant of this basic right at this time.
Rule 8.04, with which we are primarily concerned, guarantees
the right to assigned counsel in these words:
If on arraignment or thereafter, in felony cases, the de-
fendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel, and shall assign counsel to
represent him at every stage of the proceeding unless he elects
to proceed without counsel or is able to retain counsel.187
Essentially the same as Federal Rule 44, this rule is a codification
of the common law.138 It was intended to satisfy both Section 11
of the Kentucky Constitution and the prevailing interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 39 Prior to Gideon v. Wain-
un'ight,40 the latter purpose was fulfilled; however, it is not clear
that this rule satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment standard after
Gideon. As was discussed above,' 4 ' the Gideon rule certainly
applies to felonies, but it is unlikely that its application will be
limited to felony cases. Restricting the right to assigned counsel
to felonies is unfair to misdemeanants and establishes a distinction
lacking substantive merit.
Furthermore, another of the Kentucky Rules is inconsistent
with this restriction. Rule 7.16 reads:
Upon the application for taking depositions if a defendant
is without counsel, the court shall advise him of his right
thereto and assign counsel to represent him unless the de-
fendant elects to proceed without counsel or is able to retain
counsel.
'35 Ibid.
136 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(b).
137 Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.04. Felony is defined as an offense punishable with
death or confinement in the penitentiary. KRS 431.060 (1963).
138Wade v. Commonwealth, 803 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1957); Gholson v. Com-
monwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948).
139 Comment (1962), Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.04.
140 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
141 See text accompanying notes 40-44 sup-ra.
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This is identical with the first sentence of Federal Rule 15(c),
which is not necessarily restricted to felony cases. 42 Certainly
the Kentucky Rule itself contains no language limiting it to
felonies and the use of depositions is not limited to felony cases.
143
Perhaps the limitation to felonies of Rule 8.04 is to be read into
Rule 7.16, but there is no indication of this except by implication
from Rule 8.04 itself.
As has been previously discussed,14 4 failure to appoint counsel
prior to arraignment, as in Rule 8.04, is unfair to the accused vis
a vis the accusor and makes a distinction concerning opportunity
for adequate preparation of a defense based solely on the amount
of money a defendant has. It is suggested that the appointment
of counsel be made at the preliminary hearing in order to provide
both the accused and accusor, as well as all defendants inter se,
substantially equal opportunities to prepare for trial.
The function of the preliminary hearing in Kentucky makes it
inconsistent to appoint counsel in a proper case only at arraign-
ment or later and not at the preliminary hearing. The preliminary
examination is considered an alternative to an immediate trial,
so its proceedings are basically implemental of and subject to
the constitutional guarantees of the rights to be heard and to be
represented by counsel.14 5 Therefore, it is inconsistent for the
state to appoint counsel for a trial but to refuse to appoint counsel
for the same offense for a proceeding that is limited by the
identical constitutional requirements. This result can be sup-
ported on the theory that a finding of probable cause at the
hearing is not a verdict of guilty and thus cannot, in itself, result
in a sentence being imposed on the defendant. But this argument
disregards the indigent's deprivation of liberty in the interim
between the preliminary hearing and trial, caused by his incar-
ceration in default of bail.
142 Fed. Rule 15(c) incorporates the right to assigned counsel of Fed. Rule
44, a codification of the common law established in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 272 (1941); Glasser v. United States
315 U.S. 60 (1942). Though not a Supreme Court decision, the right to assigned
counsel was extended to a misdemeanant in Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1942); thus the felony limitation is not an iron clad restriction.
143 Ky. R. Civ. P. 26.01 provides that "any party may take the testimony of
any person ... by deposition.. ." The Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise
provided for by law, apply as well to criminal cases. Gholson v. Commonwealth,
212 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Ky., 1948).
144 See text accompanying notes 69-72, supra.
145 General Comment (1962), Ky. R. Crim. P., Part II.
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Failure to grant an appeal has been traditionally held not to
be a denial of a constitutional right in Kentucky on the basis
that the appeal is a privilege entirely within the province of
the legislature and not an inherent right.'46 The right to ap-
pointed counsel on appeal was not settled until 1963 in the case
of McIntosh v. Commonwealth.47 After approving prior thought
that "appellate review, as such, in criminal cases is not a con-
stitutional right,"14 the court adopted the rule in Douglas v.
California14 to the effect that "when a statute authorizes an
original appeal as a matter of right, the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an indigent defendant
the assistance of counsel in prosecuting it."'50 The court said
further that due process compels the court to inform the de-
fendant of his right to assigned counsel at the trial, but that
equal protection placed no such burden on the court regarding
an appeal; rather, equal protection guarantees the defendant a
right to counsel and to a transcript only if he requests it.'5' It
would seem more consistent with the spirit of the Douglas case
to establish that where a defendant can appeal as a matter of
right, he should be informed of this right to appeal by the court,
just as he must be informed of his right to counsel, and that
counsel must be provided if he then indicates an intention or
desire to appeal. The burden should not be put on the defendant
to request appointment of counsel at any stage at which he may
have assigned counsel as a matter of right. In other words,
whether the right is given by the due process or the equal pro-
tection clause, it should invoke upon the court an affirmative duty
to make that right effective.
It is conceded that there is a need for the states to avoid
wasting public funds by subsidizing frivolous appeals. But when
the appeal of right is granted only when the sentence imposed
is substantial, as in Kentucky, 152 it is not unreasonable to require
146 Smith v. Bastin, 192 Ky. 164, 232 S.W. 415 (1921).
147 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963).
148 Id. at 335.
140 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
150 368 S.W.2d at 335.
15' Id. at 331, 336.
15
2 KRS 21.140(1) provides an appeal as a matter of right from a
circuit court judgment imposing a sentence of confinement or imprisonment of 12
months or more. However, since the moral condemnation attaches to the convic-
(Continued on next page)
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the state to provide counsel in all these cases. Discretionary
appeals from less severe sentences do not fall within the mandate
of Douglas v. California. It is with regard to appeals of this
nature that the state should be allowed to retain a procedure
designed to protect public funds and the appellate court from
frivolous appeals.
A significant omission in the statutes and rules is the failure
to provide for reimbursement of reasonable and necessary ex-
penses in preparing the defense or for compensation for the
assigned lawyer. Though an adequate defense may depend
upon an expensive investigation or test, they are unavailable to
the indigent unless his assigned counsel pays for them. Until
such necessary elements of an adequate defense are provided by
some means other than the indigent or his assigned counsel, the
indigent defendants cannot have the full benefit of an adversary
system.
C. Procedure Followed in Kentucky
Regardless of the adequacy of the constitutional and statutory
provisions, a more significant indication of the protection afforded
indigents is found in the procedure actually followed by the
trial courts. For this purpose a brief questionnairei' 3 was sent to
judges of both county and circuit courts selected from various
parts of the state. No attempt was made to cover all the courts
in the state, but the replies appear sufficiently consistent to
indicate the procedure generally followed. It should be kept in
mind that all but one of the replies were from circuit courts
where the ratio of felonies to misdemeanors is high. The follow-
ing discussion, except where indicated, is based on the replies
to the questionnaire.
Conditions Under Which Counsel Is Assigned
There is no set standard used to determine indigency, but the
need for appointed counsel is determined by the accused's
assertion of financial inability and his responses to general ques-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
tion of the crime charged and not merely to the sentence imposed, it is submitted
that the appeal of right should be granted on the basis of the maximum punish-
ment permissible.
153 The questionnaire is set forth in Appendix A.
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tions by the court concerning ownership of real and personal
property and earning ability.
The accused is not required to make a formal request for
assigned counsel. In general, if he appears without counsel and
the reason is financial inability, the court asks whether he desires
to have an attorney appointed and appoints one if the answer is
affirmative.
The circuit courts in general make no substantial distinction
between appointing counsel in ordinary felonies and misde-
meanors, though they do attempt to assign more experienced
counsel in the "more serious felonies" and usually appoint two
attorneys in a capital case. The relatively small number of
misdemeanors actually tried in the circuit courts is probably a
major factor in explaining the uniform treatment of felonies and
misdemeanors. However, in a few of the circuit courts, no
attorneys are appointed in misdemeanor cases unless there are
unusual circumstances, such as a substantial penalty or a de-
fendant's incompetence. Though this latter practice is in accord
with the statutory standards, 15 4 the lack of uniformity among the
circuit courts is undesirable.
It was pointed out that the county courts are under no
obligation to assign counsel since they do not try felonies 55 and
that assignment of counsel in those courts generally depends
on a specific request by the defendant coupled with unusual
circumstances. The norm, then, is inconsistent treatment of the
same offense between the county and circuit courts where they
have concurrent jurisdiction.'56 If the indigent is tried in the
circuit court, he may receive assigned counsel as a matter of
course; but if he is tried in a county court within the same
judicial circuit, he would be denied assigned counsel, absent
unusual circumstances. The assignment of counsel for a given
offense should not depend on the fortuity of the particular court
in which a person is tried.
154 Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.04.
155 Jurisdiction of county courts extends at most to penal and misdemeanor
cases punishable by a maximum fine of $500 or imprisonment for not more than
12 months, or both. KRS 25.010.
156 County and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction of all penal and
misdemeanor cases where punishment is limited to a fine of not more than $500
or imprisonment for not more than 12 months, or both. KRS 25.010.
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Time at Which Counsel Is Assigned
The defendant first appears in the circuit court to be arraigned
upon the charge, and the uniform practice in the circuit courts
is to assign counsel at this time. All prior stages in the proceed-
ings have taken place in the lower courts. If the defendant
specifically demands counsel in the preliminary proceedings, he
may be so provided, but it is an exception rather than the rule.
Through this practice complies vith the statutory requirement,r3
the lack of assistance of assigned counsel prior to arraignment,
except in special cases, is inherently unfair.15
Percentage of Cases with Assigned Counsel
The estimates of the percentage of all criminal cases in the
circuit courts in which the defendant is indigent range from 40
per cent to 50 per cent for most of the state to 75 per cent in
the eastern part. Several of the judges thought the percentage
was on the increase. Though no estimates on the percentages in
the lower courts were received, there is no reason to expect it to
be significantly different. Very few of the indigents make an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel; but even if they do,
the judges tend to refuse to accept a plea of guilty until after
the accused consults with an attorney. This implies that the
judges do not regard these waivers as being "intelligently,
competently, understandingly and voluntarily" 5 9 made.
Selection of Counsel
There is no inflexible limitation of assignments to a specific
segment of the Bar, though as a practical matter the newly
admitted members of the Bar receive the bulk of the assignments.
Some local Bar associations include all lawyers under a given age,
regardless of specialty, in the group from which appointments
are made. Those attorneys with considerable criminal experience
tend to receive most of the appointments to the more serious
felonies and capital offenses.
Generally the judge makes his own selection, but the method
used varies from straight rotation to selection from appropriate
157 Ky. R. Crim. P. 8.04.
158 See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
159 Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 88, 212 S.W.2d 537, 540 (1948).
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lawyers present in the courtroom on the day of arraignment.
When an appointment is made in a lower court, the judge
normally selects some attorney who happens to be in the court-
room or calls an attorney at random.160
The frequency of assignments per attorney ranges from one in
three years to twelve to twenty per year, depending on the
system used to select the lawyers.
Ordinarily the lawyer who was appointed for the trial handles
the case on appeal, if an appeal is taken; but the judges point
out that fewer appeals are taken from cases with assigned counsel.
One judge, while noting that the practice in his court was the
same as the rest, expressed doubt whether the court could
require such an attorney or anyone else to take the appeal. This
is unexplainable in view of the recent Kentucky case of McIntosh
v. Commonwealth.'61
D. Summary and Conclusions
It is clear that a substantial and increasing need for assigned
counsel exists in Kentucky. The state crime rate has increased
more rapidly than the national average, and both the level of the
crime rate and the rate of increase are especially alarming for a
state with Kentucky's population distribution. The adverse eco-
nomic conditions prevalent in a large part of the state, con-
tributing to the increase in the crime rate, have drastically
increased the need for assigned counsel. Yet Kentucky has failed
to make any changes in its traditional assigned counsel system
to provide for this increased need within its communities,
preferring instead to rely on assigning more and more cases to
the newly admitted members of the Bar. In doing so, the state
imposes an unfair burden on these young attorneys; and in
refusing to change its statutory structure in accord with the spirit
of Gideon v. Wainwright, it fails to discharge its responsibility to
its indigent citizens. A disparity exists between the representation
provided indigent defendants in Kentucky and that contem-
plated by the due process and equal protection clauses of the
federal Constitution. The reason lies not in a moral failure of the
160 Several of the circuit judges commented on this practice in the county
courts in addition to the one reply from a county judge.
161 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963). See text accompanying note 147.
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people responsible but simply in a failure to deal with the
problem in realistic, twentieth-century terms.
Kentucky's system for providing counsel for indigent accused
has not successfully met the challenge posed by the change from
the traditional idea that legal aid is a charity to the concept that
it is a political and social right, a change accompanying the
increased emphasis in national thought on human rights. 62 Under
the old philosophy it was felt that legal aid in criminal cases was
a matter within the discretion of the courts and the members of
the legal profession and that when it was provided it should be
given free. The current thought that it is a social right demands
that all who need it should get it and those who render it should
receive adequate compensation.
1 3
The representation given in Kentucky, being guaranteed only
in felony cases, fails to provide the necessary assistance to all who
need it. In actual practice, the courts appoint counsel more than
is required by statute since indigent misdemeanants in the circuit
courts are often assigned counsel as a matter of course and some
misdemeanants in the lower courts receive assigned counsel
under unusual circumstances. But the need of all those accused
of crime who are unable to pay for an adequate defense cannot
be satisfied by relying on such fortuitous circumstances. In
addition, when assistance is provided, it is rarely provided early
enough to adequately protect the accused's rights since counsel
is not assigned prior to arraignment except in unusual situations.
The inability of assigned counsel in Kentucky to spend a cent
on the defense except out of his own pocket is a further indication
of the failure of the system to keep pace with the changing
philosophy. If the indigent's right to the assistance of counsel
is indeed a social right, then it is incumbent upon society as a
whole to bear the economic burden of providing that assistance.
Certainly lawyers must be the ones to render the service, but
there is no logical reason to impose the expense of fulfilling
society's responsibility on those members of the Bar who perform
the work, especially on the newest members who can least afford
such expense. In this respect Kentucky's system fails to enlist
the community participation and responsibility thought to be
102 Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 737, 743-744 (1961).
103 Ibid.
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essential to an adequate system.' Furthermore, this failure to
provide for any compensation or reimbursement may deprive
defendants of the benefits of a full investigation if the assigned
counsel is unestablished and cannot bear the full cost himself.
Until the system provides facilities that are readily available to
an assigned attorney or at least compensates him for his expenses,
the system cannot provide the equal protection that is intended
by the substantive law.
It has long been assumed that the traditional assigned
counsel system adequately meets the needs of indigent defendants
in rural areas and small towns. 65 It might seem that Kentucky
as a whole is the type of state suitable for such a system. But
such an assumption overlooks the increasing proportion of Ken-
tucky's population found in metropolitan areas; 6 ' the state has
not developed a system adequately protecting indigent accuseds
in these areas. For example, as of January, 1961, Jefferson County,
Kentucky, was one of only thirty-two counties in the United
States with a population of more than four hundred thousand
in which there was no organized defender office. 67 Other com-
munities such as Lexington and Owensboro are anything but
rural in nature, and the Kentucky suburbs across the river from
Cincinnati, Ohio, are typically metropolitan in composition.
Certainly the neighborliness and personal contact between ac-
cuseds and local lawyers, thought to provide adequate repre-
sentation in rural areas, do not exist in these communities. Here
again Kentucky has failed to meet the challenge posed by the
change of modern times.
Even in rural areas it is doubtful that the traditional neighbor-
liness of the small town lawyer exists today to the same extent as
formerly. 6 Though the small town indeed is a more leisurely
environment, both small town and big city lawyers must make a
living from their practice. Lawyers' motivations are many and
164 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 61-62.
165 E.g. Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 213 (1955);
Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 136 (1951); Equal Justice, supra note 5,
at 80.
166 Data in Bureau of the Census, I U.S. Census of Population: 1950, com-
pared with I U.S. Census of Population: 1960.
3
67 Brownell, Supplement to Legal Aid in the United States 71 (1961).
' 6 8 Willcox and Bloustein, Account of a Field Study in a Rural Area of the
Representation of Indigents Accused of Crime, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 567 (1959).
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are not limited to their professional duties as officers of the court.
Though the neighborliness traditionally relied on to adequately
protect indigents under the assigned counsel system may actually
be found in certain areas of Kentucky, the assumption that it
does exist should not be blindly accepted.
The quality of the defense provided by Kentucky's assigned
counsel system is also subject to criticism. The primary objection
is the widespread practice of assigning the bulk of the cases to
the newly-admitted members of the Bar, those with the least
experience and the still undeveloped skill. Though the Kentucky
judges responding to the questionnaire for this study generally
feel the defense is adequate, other studies indicate widespread
skepticism of the ability of raw young attorneys to handle
adequately any but the simplest case. 69 Though it is generally
agreed that these young lawyers have the desired zeal and loyalty,
it is emphasized that ability in criminal matters is largely a result
of judgment and wisdom acquired through experience and not
from books. 170 The practice of concentrating the assignments on
the younger members of the Bar may be rationalized by the need
to provide for the young members the accompanying experience
and education that is not otherwise available . 7' Though the
desire to educate the young lawyers is laudable, there is no
sufficient reason for doing so at the expense of indigent accuseds.
This educational function could be much more effectively served
if the young lawyers were under the supervision of experienced
counsel, but opportunity for such supervision is lacking in the
Kentucky system.
The assigned counsel system also denies the indigent the
benefits of specialization in the defense, except in those unusual
cases where an experienced criminal lawyer is appointed. For
example, an experienced criminal lawyer is more efficient in the
preparation of the case, is familiar with the tactics of certain
prosecutors and is more apt to be aware of possible defenses not
apparent to the novice.
The prevailing arguments against the assigned counsel system
10 9 Brownell, op. cit. supra, note 165 at 138-143 (1951); Willcox and
Bloustein, supra note 168 at 568; Equal justice, supra note 5 at 64-66.
170 Willcox and Bloustein, supra note 168 at 568.
171 Id. at 569; Equal Justice, supra note 5 at 65-66.
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were aptly summarized in an address by Judge Augustus Hand
to the Judicial Conference of the United States in these words:
172
It is clear that when cases of poor persons needing defense
become numerous and occur repeatedly, the voluntary and
uncompensated services of counsel are not an adequate means
of providing representation. To call on lawyers constantly
for unpaid service is unfair to them and any attempt to do so
is almost bound to break down after a time. To distribute
such assignments among a large number of attorneys in order
to reduce the burden upon anyone, is to entrust the representa-
tion of the defendants to attorneys who in many cases are not
proficient in criminal trials, whatever their general ability,
and who for one reason or another cannot be depended upon
for an adequate defense. Too often under such circumstances
the representation becomes little more than a form.
These words are directly applicable to the Kentucky situation.
PART III: ComPARIsoN wrrm ALTERNATE SYSTEMS
Primarily there is one alternative system for protecting the
right to assigned counsel-the organized defender office, whether
it be a voluntary defender organization, a public defender office
or a combination. These types of offices differ principally in
administrative and financial respects, while performing essen-
tially the same services. A detailed presentation of the operations
of these groups is not intended;'73 instead we will consider the
benefits available under them and the consequent advantages
over the assigned counsel system.
A. The Public Defender System
The public defender is a public official whose duty it is to see
that all defendants, regardless of means, obtain due process and
equal protection under law in criminal prosecutions. 7 4 The
office may be composed of several defenders in the large metro-
politan areas, or it may be staffed by one man on a part-time
basis in smaller communities.175 In addition to the defenders
172 Comm. to Consider the Adequacy of Existing Provisions for the Protection
of the Rights of Indigent Litigants in the Federal Courts, Report, as quoted in
Brownell, op. cit. supra note 165 at 138-189.
173 For a fuller discussion of these organizations see Brownell, Legal Aid in
the United States 125-135, 194-207 (1951); Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 50-53,
68-75.
174 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 51.
175 Id. at 52.
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themselves, the larger offices may have full-time, experienced
investigators as well as funds for specialized tests and examina-
tions and other expenses incurred in unusual circumstances.'7
Accordingly, a large suite of offices and library may be provided
where needed, or the part-time defender may operate from his
private law office.' 77 The public defender may be appointed by
the local courts or local officials, selected by a competitive civil-
service process or occasionally elected.1'7 An essential char-
acteristic is the financing of the public defender office from
public funds.1'7 9
The scope of the representation by a public defender is
practically unlimited provided the statute creating it does not
restrict it. Because of this, the office can provide representation
to all indigents who need assistance in all courts if it is adequately
staffed.' Furthermore, the organizational aspects of the office
make it feasible for the defenders to interview prisoners on a
regular basis soon after arrest and well before arraignment. 81
This early assistance is not available under the assigned counsel
system. With no restrictions on the scope of the defenders' power,
this organization can continue with a case and prosecute an
appeal when the office feels there is any purpose to be served
by doing so. The prosecution of these appeals does not impose
an additional uncompensated burden on the attorney as is done
under the assigned counsel system.
The quality of the defense provided by a public defender
office is undoubtedly better than that of an assigned counsel
program. The quality is, of course, dependent on the defender
himself, but the system assures the benefits of experienced,
competent counsel to all indigents. In a multi-defender office,
even if a relatively inexperienced attorney is selected, the super-
vision needed to train him without committing costly errors is
available.182 Again, this is lacking with the assigned counsel
system. As a consequence, this system can utilize volunteers,
such as law students, much more effectively than the assigned
170 Ibid., Brownell, op. cit. supra note 173 at 225-226 (1951).
177 Equal Justice, supra note 5 at 52.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
18) Id. 72-73; Brownell, op. cit. supra note 173, at 180-131.
181 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 74.
182 An Interview with Herman Pollock, 22 Legal Aid Brief Case 143 (1964).
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counsel system.183 The quality of the defense is futher improved
by the opportunity for specialization and its advantage of more
deeply developed skill and efficiency. This system can also pro-
vide the investigatory facilities needed for a thorough preparation
of both the law and the facts.
184
Advantages of another nature also accrue under the public
defender system. Because of the defender's opportunity to devote
full time to the work and the greater efficiency possible in an
organized office devoted to this work, there is a definite saving
of time for everyone involved. Fewer continuances are necessary
since the defense has not been interrupted by other matters
preventing timely preparation and the defense may begin early
enough to make a continuance at arraignment unnecessary. 185
In this respect, the opportunity for more complete investigation
may enable the defender to secure proper disposition of the case
by negotiation and thus avoid unnecessary trials. This saving of
time also results in a saving of money. The cost per defense is
much less than under an assigned counsel system, if the volume
of cases is high enough to merit a defender system, 88 and the
time saved in the judicial proceedings reduce the administrative
expense of the courts allocable to these cases.
Although many advantages of the public defender system are
readily apparent, the plan has been strenuously opposed by some.
The criticism generally revolve about certain possibilities for
abuse. Foremost among these objections is the charge that the
system is susceptible to political manipulation and domination
by the court.187 It is conceded that where political considerations
prevail or where the defender is subservient to the judge, the
representation can be as bad or worse than that of the least able
assigned counsel. But these objections are related only to the
administration of the system and not to any incurable defect. It
is suggested that where such objections are a reality, the defect
lies in the organization responsible for administering the program
and not in the system itself.
183 Ibid.
184 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 52.
185 Brownell, op. cit. supra note 173, at 145.
186 Id. at 144-145- Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 81.
187 Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 737, 747-748 (1961);
Stewart, The Public Defender System is Unsound in Principal, 32 J. Am. Jud. Soc y
115, 118 (1948).
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Judge Dimock has said the public defender system is an
undesirable departure from our adversary system in that it forces
the accused to accept a lawyer appointed and paid by his op-
ponent. 8 Such an argument quickly breaks down. To maintain
it, he must equate the prosecution with either the government
or the judiciary. If he chooses the latter comparison, he is in effect
saying the judiciary is the defendant's opponent, yet it is the
judiciary which is considered to have the duty of protecting the
defendant's rights if he has no counsel. If he makes the first
comparison, he is defeated by the fact that the judges and jury
are paid by the alleged opponent, yet they are sworn to impartial
performance of their roles and no one contends that this prevents
them from achieving substantial justice in criminal trials. A
related argument is that establishing public defenders is equiva-
lent to socializing the legal profession. 89 This emotional proposi-
tion has little to support it in fact. It implies government control
and direction, which is not inherent in a public defender system
to any greater extent than in the judiciary; yet the judiciary is
by purpose and function free from government control. The
argument has no meaning unless socialism encompasses every
device through which the community discharges its responsi-
bilities. °90
In considering attacks against the public defender system on
the basis of position, source of income or relation to those who
select the defender, it must be remembered that the defenders
are members of the Bar of the state and have taken the oath of
admission to the Bar and probably an oath of office. To condemn
the public defender system on these grounds is to say that the
oath is taken lightly.' 9' These charges against the system are
related only to potential abuses, dependent on the character of
the defender and those who administer the system, and not to
the unalterable nature of the system itself. Where the selection
is based on merit, tenure is independent of politics, and the
188 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-36 (1963).
189 Id. at 37-41.
19 0 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 45.
191 Harrington and Getty, Public Defender: A Progressive Step Towards
Justice, 42 A.B.A.J. 1189 (1956), as reprinted in Joint Committee on Continuing
Legal Education of the A.L.I. and ABA, The Problem of Assistance to the
Indigent Accused 79 (1961).
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defender maintains the loyalty to his client demanded by the
profession, these potential abuses are eliminated.
B. The Voluntary Defender System
The voluntary defender organization is a privately controlled,
non-governmental organization dependent for support on chari-
table donations-either directly to the organization or indirectly
through contributions to cooperative charity funds.192 This system
enlists the enthusiasm and efforts of the more idealistic members
of the Bar, both those who are selected as the defenders and
those who take it upon themselves to administer the program.
The scope and quality of the defense possible under this
system are the same as under the public defender system. An
added advantage is the opportunity to enlist community partici-
pation and responsibilities by including community leaders from
outside the legal profession in the administrative group.193 This
opportunity does not exist in the assigned counsel system. While
the public defender system is susceptible to political manipulation
and domination by the court in some circumstances, the voluntary
defender organization is completely independent and not subject
to political pressures. 94 Furthermore, there is no need to worry
about restrictive statutory provisions which could reduce the
effectiveness of the public defender. In other words, the ad-
vantages of the public defender system are available through the
voluntary defender system, but the potential disadvantages of
the public defender office are not applicable to the voluntary
organization.
The main drawback to this system is the uncertainty of
financial support which could result in a curtailment of services,
especially during a depression when the need is greatest.19
C. The Public-Private Defender System
This type of organization is essentially a voluntary defender
organization, in terms of control, that is supported by public
funds.'96 It combines the freedom from political pressures of
192 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 51.
193 Id. at 71-72.
' 94 Pollock, Equal Justice in Practice, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 737, 747-748 (1961).
195 Beaney, The Bight to Counsel in American Courts 217 (1955).
196 Equal Justice, supra note 5, at 52-53.
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the voluntary organization with the security of financial support
of the public defender office. Though apparently not as numer-
ous, 197 it can be utilized just as effectively as either of the other
defender systems.
D. Summary
A comparison of Kentucky's assigned counsel system with the
defender organizations indicates that the deficiencies of the
Kentucky system are not insoluble. The defender organizations
are clearly able to provide representation that is broader in
scope, is more complete in investigation and preparation, is
effective at an earlier state in the proceedings, is uniformly more
competent and experienced, and is less of a financial burden on
the attorneys than that which is provided by Kentucky's system.
Furthermore, these benefits are accompanied by a distinct saving
of time and money. The availability of such substantial improve-
ment demands action by Kentucky in improving the administra-
tion of justice to the indigent accused. Regardless of the final
solution adopted, the need for intelligent action is urgent.
PART IV: RECOMnmNDATIONS
It is urged that Kentucky initiate changes that will provide
effective representation for indigent accuseds in a much wider
variety of criminal cases than is now available. Only those
offenses falling within the limits of the petty offense concept
should be excluded. The system should provide for representa-
tion at the earliest practical point following arrest, certainly at
or before the preliminary examination in cases where one is
conducted. The method to be adopted will depend on the size
and nature of the community, the percentage of defendants who
are unable to pay for an adequate defense, the conditions within
the local Bar association (e.g., extent of specialization), the
prevailing community attitude, the probable cost of the program
and the public and private resources available to meet this cost. 98
This proposal raises two main problems-the determination
of the relevant conditions and the implementation of the system
107 Ibid.
108 Equal justice, supra note 5, at 79-82.
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selected. It is recommended that an extensive survey of the
existing conditions in the various areas and communities in the
state be conducted. The survey must go beyond the inquiries of
similar studies elsewhere,'99 which make no attempt to investigate
the attitude of the community outside of the legal profession, the
probable cost of adequate representation or the availability of
public or private resources needed to meet the cost.
Either the Kentucky State Bar Association, the Judicial Coun-
cil200 or the Committee on the Administration of Justice201 could
conduct the study. Though the Bar traditionally is concerned
with problems of the legal profession, the research organization
needed to carry out this project is not immediately available.
The Judicial Council has the responsibility to make investiga-
tions and recommendations for improvements in the administra-
tion of justice.20 ' The Director of the Administrative Office of
the Courts, with his duty to collect and compile statistical and
other data concerning the operation of the court, 20 3 would be of
great assistance if the survey were to be conducted by the
judiciary. But the data collected by the Director deals only with
the scope of the need for assigned counsel and does not extend
to the other relevant conditions of the communities. 4 A dis-
advantage in choosing either the Bar Association or the Judicial
Council is the allocation of this work to a particular segment of
the judicial system, which is responsible as a whole for administer-
ing justice. A more diversified group, representing all areas of the
legal profession, would be preferable.
The ideal organization for this task is Kentucky's Committee
on the Administration of Justice. Formed in 1961 by the Board
of Bar Examiners of the Kentucky State Bar Association as an
ad hoc2 5 committee "for the purpose of establishing a closer
199 Willcox and Bloustein, supra, note 168, Appendix I, 575; The Representa-
tion of Indigent Criminal Defendants in the Federal District Court, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 579, 614 (1963).
200 Established by KRS 22.050 (1968).
201 Breckinridge, Kentucky's Committee on the Administration of Justice, 46
J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 147' (1962).
202 KRS 22.050 (1968).
203 KRS 22.110, 22.120 (1963).
204 The Director may require all necessary reports from the courts and clerks
regarding rules, dockets and business dispatched or pending before the courts.
KRS 22.120.
205 Six months after formation, the committee dropped "ad boc" from its
name, recognizing that it would be a permanent and continuing body. Breckin-
ridge, supra note 219, at 147.
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working relationship for the bench, the bar and the office of the
attorney general in the administration of justice, and to recom-
mend the enactment of such legislation as may be appropriate
to facilitate the discharge of the duties of these offices,"2°6 this
comnmittee provides the coordination between the various branches
of the legal profession needed to make such investigations and
reconmmendations feasible. 7
Regardless of the plan adopted, it is recommended that an
advisory and administrative group be established for each local
representation program.0 Such an organization, if composed of
persons from the general public as well as the Bar, can form a link
between the general public and the system and enlist com-
munity participation. The board offers an ideal way to assure
the independence and freedom from political pressures needed
for the operation of any system. Though this organization seems
most clearly applicable to the voluntary defender system, it is
feasible for the other systems. Such a board could be of special
value when a new system (other than assigned counsel) is being
established, allowing the defenders themselves to concentrate
on the principal activities of the program instead of administrative
details.
It is doubtful that the public defender and voluntary defender
organizations are applicable in Kentucky except for a few cities
and areas such as Louisville, Lexington, Covington (and adjacent
conm-unities in the Cincinnati area), and Owensboro. Even in
some of these areas, the large voluntary financial outlay needed
to support a voluntary defender program may be unavailable,
further restricting the usefulness of this type of program for
Kentucky. On the other hand, the combined population of the
above named cities is one-third of the state's total population.0 9
If the doubts expressed in the study of the assigned counsel
system in Tompkins County, New York,210 are representative of
20 Ibid.
207 The membership included the chief justice and the administrative director
of the Court of Appeals, the president and secretary of the State Bar Association,
a bar commissioner, the deans of the state's two law schools, the president of the
Commonwealth Attorneys Ass'n, a representative of the Ky. Municipal League,
a representative of the circuit judges, the Governor's administrative assistant and
special assistant in charge of reorganization, and the Attorney General.
20$The content of this paragraph is drawn primarily from Equal Justice,
supra note 5, at 83-85.
209 Bureau of the Census, I Population of the United States: 1960.
210 Willcox and Bloustein, supra note 168.
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the assigned counsel system in general when used in communities
of more than 30,000 population, this one-third of Kentucky's
population cannot adequately be protected by the assigned
counsel system.
Thus it is apparent that whatever overall program is de-
veloped, it must be flexible. Many areas which can now be served
by the assigned counsel system will become large enough to
warrant establishing an organized defender office, and the means
of making the change when needed must be readily available.
In this respect, it is recommended that Kentucky enact a com-
prehensive legislative program modeled primarily on the plan
set forth in S. 1057, of the Crimnal Justice Act of 1963.211 The
main advantage of this plan over its sister plan, S. 63, is the
flexibility requisite to a comprehensive program for a jurisdiction
containing diverse types of communities.
On August 20, 1964, the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 was
passed.212 The Act is S. 1057 as amended. However, the only
significant amendment deleted all authority to establish public
defender systems for the Federal courts. In thus amending, Con-
gress deplorably rejected both an opportunity and a responsibility
to provide for the true administration of justice in criminal matters
before the Federal courts. Although the Act does indeed "pro-
mote the cause of criminal justice by providing for the representa-
tion of defendants who are financially unable to obtain an ade-
quate defense in criminal cases in the courts of the United
States",213 it does not authorize the use of the system proved
most effective in providing an "adequate defense." Neither polit-
ical nor administrative convenience excuses this failure.
Regardless of the Congressional passage of S. 1057 as amended,
the original plan embodied by S. 1057 is recommended without
reservation for Kentucky. There is no need to go into a detailed
discussion of S. 1057 before amendment; it is sufficient to point
out its main characteristics. The plan provides for the assignment
of private attorneys, establishment of full-time or part-time
public defenders and assistants, utilization of existing defender
organizations or a combination of these. The decision as to the
211 Hearings on S. 68 and S. 1057 Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1963).
212 Pub. L. No. 88-455, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 20, 1964).
213 Id., Preamble (emphasis added).
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plan to be used in a specific area is left to the Federal District
Judge, under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Council. The scope
of the representation includes all criminal offenses (felonies and
misdemeanors)2" and begins at the preliminary hearing. Further-
more, adequate provision is made for compensation of attorneys
as well as for the facilities needed for a full investigation. The
quality of the defense provided by public defenders is safe-
guarded by requiring substantial legal experience as a prerequisite
to appointment. Such a plan provides the flexibility needed to
provide for future growth and development.
There is no reason why this plan, in essence, cannot be
adopted xvith appropriate modifications in Kentucky. The pro-
grant could be organized either on a county system or by Judicial
Circuits. The former has the advantage of fitting the plan to the
specific conditions of a relatively small, homogeneous group in
most cases. However, this would probably result in few public
defender offices being established. Organization on a Judicial
Circuit basis would not change the effect of the plan in those
counties that are now large enough to warrant considering an
organized defender office as these counties currently comprise
one Judicial Circuit each.ala Since the Circuit Courts, through
their jurisdiction over felonies, presently account for a large
majority of the appointments, it is essential that whatever local
plans are adopted be designed to cope with the needs of these
courts.
It is possible that placing the responsibility on the circuit
courts to devise the appropriate plan will result in full-time or
part-time public defender offices being established to serve a
three- or four-county circuit, while the counties individually
would not recognize the need for such services or the possibility
of providing these on a joint basis. Such a plan would be feasible
even if occasional conflicts in trial dates develop since the court
could assign a private attorney in such cases.
A minor problem involved in implementing a plan similar to
that of S. 1057 is the need to make the services available in both
county and circuit courts, rather than in just one trial court as
in the federal plan. However, there is no need for conflict here,
214 Petty offenses are not considered crimes. Schick v. United States, 195
U.S. 65 (1904).2 15 The Ky. Judicial Council, Biennial Report, Table 1, B-1 (1962).
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and an adequately staffed defender office can handle the case
load of several courts.
2 16
Though there are currently no voluntary defender organiza-
tions in Kentucky, the provision allowing utilization of such
in the plan adopted should not be eliminated. It is possible
that the most practical way to solve the problem in Louisville,
for example, is by a criminal division of the existing legal aid
society. 17 Moreover, the law schools of the University of Ken-
tucky and University of Louisville may establish student volun-
tary defender organizations that can be of invaluable assistance
in such a program.*
In addition, the investigating facilities provided by a full
defender office should be made available for the benefit of
defendants who can afford to retain a lawyer but who can't afford
to bear the cost of an adequate investigation. The cost of such
supplementary service should be borne by the state and is feasible
under this flexible plan.
Whatever program is selected for a given area would be
subject to the approval and supervision of the state Judicial
Council. This group, because of its duty to investigate and
recommend changes for the administration of justice and because
of its state-wide jurisdiction, should be able to make appropriate
recommendations to various areas based on observation of other
areas in the state.
The quality of representation provided is, in the long run, the
key to the success of any system. This depends primarily on the
character and ability of the attorney and the degree of inde-
pendence from political pressure and obligations he is able to
maintain. This latter point is one of the chief advantages of
establishing an advisory group. Where an advisory group exists,
composed of leaders of the Bar, judges, and members from the
general public, it should be vested with the responsibility of
selecting the defender and his assistants. Where such a group
is not established, it is recommended that the defender be selected
210 See Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 130-131 (1951).
217 This is probably the only significant opportunity for a voluntary defender
office in Kentucky. It is suported entirely by charitable funds and private
sources. Id. at 232; Bro-nell, Supplement to Legal Aid in the United States
(1961).
* Ed. note: Such a program was implemented at the University of Kentucky
in 1963.
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by county and city officials and judges on the basis of a competi-
tive exam. The term of the appointment should be indefinite,
providing a reasonable amount of security to the defender con-
tingent upon filffilling his responsibilities. A prerequisite for ap-
pointment as a defender should be a minimum of five years legal
practice with at least a moderate amount of criminal work
included.
Assuming the assigned counsel system will be retained in large
areas of the state, even if the suggested comprehensive system
is initiated, certain changes in the existing system are essential.
Of primary importance here is the need to provide reasonable
compensation for time necessarily spent by appointed attorneys.
A study of local fees and practices will indicate the requisite
amount. The importance of this provision in improving the
quality of the representation cannot be overemphasized. It would
tend to decrease the judges' reluctance to appoint experienced
lawyers in any but unusual cases, and it would decrease the
tendency to enter a plea of guilty in doubtful cases.
In order to avoid possible accusations of favoritism, the
attorneys should be appointed on a straight rotation basis from a
list of qualified attorneys, preferably by a centralized administra-
tive unit.
The provision of compensation makes it possible to limit the
appointments to qualified attorneys, thus elevating the representa-
tion of indigents to a truly professional responsibility and pre-
venting it from being an educational experience and chore for
the least experienced men. Under this system, it is possible to
train the younger men by appointing them under the supervision
of experienced counsel. The training provided would be superior
to that gained from the current assigned counsel system.
An additional element necessary for an adequate assigned
counsel system is making the investigative facilities of the state
available to the indigent defendant. If necessary expenses are
allowed, there is less need for this than otherise, but it is still
essential in regard to crime laboratories and similar facilities.
A requirement of an adequate system is that it provide the
necessary representation for all those who need it. The indigent
accused of a serious misdemeanor needs legal assistance but is
generally denied it in Kentucky today. Therefore, where the
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assigned counsel system is retained, it should be expanded to
provide representation in all but petty offenses. Furthermore,
this representation should be extended in time, becoming effective
where the accused is first brought before the magistrate.
Our judicial system can do no more than provide a fair
administration of justice and provide equal protection under the
law. The former cannot be done without the latter. It is clear
that in many respects indigents in Kentucky are denied that equal
protection. The problem has no easy solution and the proposed
program is not perfect. Until major changes are made and the
state fulfills its purpose of serving the individual, equal justice for
all will not be realized.
APPENDIX A
QUESTIONNAIRE
Conditions Under Which Counsel Is Assigned
1. What standard is used to determine indigency?
2. What investigation beyond questioning by the court is involved
in this determination?
8. Must the accused request assigned counsel?
4. Is counsel assigned to indigents in all criminal cases?
5. Is any distinction made between felony and misdemeanor cases?
a. Is the standard of indigency different? If so, how?
b. Must the accused request counsel in one but not both? If, so,
which?
c. Is an attempt made to assign more experienced counsel in
felony cases?
d. Is there any other distinction? (Please specify)
6. Are any of the above distinctions made between capital and non-
capital cases? If so, which ones?
7. If counsel is assigned in some but not all misdemeanor cases,
where is the line drawn?
Time at Which Counsel Is Assigned
1. At what stage in the proceedings is counsel normally assigned?
2. If time of assignment varies, what factors account for the dif-
ference?
Percentage of Cases with Assigned Counsel
1. In what percentage of all criminal cases is the accused indigent?
2. In what percentage of cases with an indigent accused is there an
intelligent waiver of the right to have counsel assigned?
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3. In what percentage of all criminal cases is counsel assigned?
Selection of Counsel
1. To what segment, if any, of the Bar are the assignments limited?
2. What method is used to select counsel? (E.g., rotation on list,
random selection from list, counsel known to judge, etc.)
3. Does each judge make his own assignments, or is there an ad-
ministrative unit for this purpose?
4. How often does each lawyer receive an assignment?
5. If an appeal is taken, does the same lawyer represent the accused
on appeal? If not, how is the new counsel selected?
Comments on Effectiveness of System
1. Does the system provide adequate counsel for every indigent
person faced with possible deprivation of liberty or other serious
criminal sanction?
2. Does the system provide representation which is experienced,
competent and zealous?
3. Does the system provide investigatory and other facilities neces-
sary for a complete defense?
4. Does the system come into operation sufficiently early so the
accused can be fully advised and his rights protected?
5. Does the system assure undivided loyalty by defense counsel to
the accused?
Any Further Comments or Explanations
APPENDLX B
Crime Index for U.S. and Kentucky, 1958-1962
Year Region
1958 S.M.S.A.b
Other cities
Rural
Total U.S.
Kentucky
1959 S.M.S.A.
Other cities
Rural
Total U.S.
Kentucky
Population
105,735,561
25,489,735
42,035,033
173,260,329
3,080,000
110,245,530
25,596,359
42,867,623
177,709,512
3,012,051
Total Offenses
1,221,208
161,238
171,476
1,553,922
Crime Indexa
1154.9
632.6
407.9
896.9
21,359 693.4
1,256,586 1139.8
165,558 673.1
170,045 396.7
1,592,189 896.0
22,649 751.9
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1960 S.M.S.A. 113,861,255 1,512,011 1327.9
Other cities 28,629,493 172,203 728.8
Rural 41,832,427 177,047 4423.2
Total U.S. 179,323,175 1,861,261 1037.9
Kentucky 3,038,156 24,666 788.9
1961 S.M.S.A. 117,152,600 1,560,887 1332.4
Other cities 24,185,300 173,959 719.3
Rural 41,615,100 191,273 459.6
Total U.S. 182,953,000 1,926,119 1052.8
Kentucky 3,076,000 24,266 788.9
1962 S.M.S.A. 118,827,652 1,672,866 1407.8
Other cities 24,883,725 187,765 754.6
Rural 42,110,646 187,710 445.8
Total U.S. 125,822,000 2,048,341 1102.3
Kentucky 3,082,000 26,928 873.7
a Crime Index-Number of offenses per 100,000 population
b S.M.S.A.-Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Explanatory Note: The Crime Index is a computation used to indicate the
probable extent, fluctuation and distribution of crime for the U.S. as a whole,
various geographical and population areas and states. The Crime Index consists
of seven important offenses counted as they become known to law enforcement
officers. Crime classifications used are: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary (breaking and entering),
larceny of $50 and over, and auto theft. The Index is ex ressed as the number
of crimes occurring per 100,000 population. The total number of crimes occurring
is unknown. Not all crimes become known to the police, not all are of sufficient
importance to be significant in an index and not all important crimes occur with
enough regularity to be meaningful in an index. With these considerations in mind,
the above crimes are selected as a group to furnish an abbreviated and convenient
measure of the crime problem. Uniform Crime Reports for the United States,
Dept. of Justice, F.B.I., p. 34 (1962).
Source of Data: Uniform Crime Reports, supra., Table 3 (1958), Table 1
(1959-1962); also p. 36 (1958-1961) and p. 38 (1962).
